ENVER PASHA

HIS STATUS IN MODERN TURKISH HISTORY

By

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Fahren ist Kunst,
Siegen ist Gottesgundt
Liman von Sanders

Enver Pasha is one of the countless men in history who had a chance to achieve greatness, but did not manage to acquire it. His meteoric rise to membership in the ruling triumvirate of the Ottoman Empire during the years 1912-1918, where he held the position of Minister of War, is overshadowed by his incompetence and ineptitude, and by his inglorious end. Failures rarely elicit attention, and possibly that is one reason why there are no definitive works about Enver Pasha. The only book written on the life of Enver is a fictionalized piece of German propaganda written under the pseudonym of Kurt Okay. (1) Aside from an excellent article in the Encyclopedia of Islam by Dankwart A. Rustow, (2) the sources used for this study have been a piecing together of circumstantial evidence, mentions in diaries, and references in articles and newspapers. Of memoir material by Enver himself, there is no trace. However, in spite of this lack, Enver
the man emerges, three-dimensional and intriguing, in quotes noted by his contemporaries, and in their recorded personal impressions of him.

I

Captain Enver Bey

As with many people from his era and region, particulars of Enver’s birth and youth are hazy. All accounts agree that he was born in Instanbul in 1881 or 1882. Rustow says that his father was a minor civil servant, but there is another interesting story, that his father was a wood-turner who did odd jobs at Yildiz, the palace of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. His efficiency attracted the attention of the Sultan, who was himself an amateur carpenter. The Sultan, so the account goes, promised to see that the wood-turner’s son would have a military education and an appointment as an officer in the army. Whether or not the Sultan himself was responsible, Enver did attend at first, the Hasan Aga Medrese in Istanbul, and then entered the military academy at Monastir when his family moved to Macedonia. Completing his course of study at Monastir, he entered the military academy in Istanbul, where, according to Rustow, he graduated second in his class.

Upon graduation, Enver was posted to the Third Army in Macedonia, where after three years he was promoted to Major. The Third Army was based in the city of Salonika, in Macedonia, a region ineffectively controlled by the Sultan because of its proximity to Western influence and because of its distance from
the central government in Istanbul. Many officers of the Third Army were angered by the constant arrears in pay, and this anger was aggravated by the fact that the Macedonian gendarmerie was commanded by European officers, brought in to control Bulgarian guerilla activities. The consequent downgrading of Ottoman status aroused patriotic feelings in the army, and its ire was directed at Sultan Abdul Hamid II for permitting the shaming of the army. This feeling led to the formation of the "Ottoman Freedom Committee" in Salonika in 1906 (8). The army officers were enrolled in secret cells, and within a year were in federation with the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP). The CUP was at that time a loose organization of expatriate intellectuals, Ottoman liberals nicknamed the Young Turks, who were based in Paris. The orientation of the original Young Turks was one of intellectual convictions and use of propaganda for governmental reforms. The Macedonian group, however, was more practical and inclined to action rather than editorializing.

Possibly the idea behind Enver's being sent to Macedonia was that having lived in his youth in Monastir, he would be well equipped to deal with the Macedonian rebels. Instead, Enver joined the Young Turk movement, becoming member number twelve of his cell. (7) What was the reason for this? Was it, as Springer says (8), because Enver was able to study and understand the tyranny of the Sultan and the misery of the people—or did he perhaps see a vision of "being in on the ground floor" of a potentially powerful organization? The Young Turks (CUP) was certainly composed of many sincere idealists with hopes...
dreams for the people and the future of their country. Whether or not such motives could be attributed to Enver is highly questionable. It would appear more likely that he saw an avenue that led to personal power, and that joining the Young Turks served a dual purpose. Most important, of course, was the possibility of being at or near the top of the element that might control Turkey at some not too distant time. Its secondary importance would be to give to Enver's life an element of spice and danger which seems to have been necessary to him. The evidence of his behavior and attitudes at the peak of his later career make the sincerity of his gravitation to the CUP rebels and their proclaimed ideals highly suspect.

His prominence in the Committee of Union and Progress' rescue of Kermanli Metrel, the popular rebel leader who was to be hanged by order of the Sultan, and his involvement in the ambush of Shemsi Pasha, the investigator sent by the Sultan (9) show that he had committed himself to identification with Young Turks. It also shows an admirable amount of daring and élan, but it does not show whether or not he was personally committed to the principles of the CUP. Sir William Ramsay's record of his conversation with a member of the Young Turks on a railroad train (10) illustrates the dedication of many of the people to the CUP ideals, but somehow this does not seem to fit with what is known of Enver Pasha. His personality as it emerges from the bits and pieces that remain would point, rather, to a pragmatic
person, who was also an impulsive, quixotic romantic. Maybe the dichotomy is the clue to the man. There is no doubt of his sincerity when as a young army major he made the famous statement on the Hill of Liberty in Salonika in July of 1908: "We are all brothers. Under the same blue sky we are all equal. We all glory in being Ottomans." (11) Yet, the same man could say, when discussing the Armenian massacres with acquaintances in Russia after his fall from power that he could never understand why the Americans were so "sentimental" about the Armenians (12) ... after all, "the Armenians have brought this upon themselves" and "we have not time to separate the innocent from the guilty." (13)

During the period of time that elapsed from Enver's emotional declaration in Salonika to his brutal statements about the Armenians, was there a change in Enver? If so, where, when, and why? Which was the "true" Enver speaking? He had been called the "symbol, soul, and incarnation of Turkish liberty . . ." and further it was said "there is assuredly no true aim or aspiration for his Empire's greatness which does not find a place in the fearless heart of Enver Bey." (14) What made the young officer who was the "hero of the revolution," who rescued Greek girls from marauding Kurds and single-handedly fought off the enraged
tribesmen with his expert swordplay\(^{15}\) turn into the evil villain that history remembers? It is difficult to believe that this is the same man that Sir Harry Luke describes as "Cruel, ruthless, treacherous, avaricious..." \(^{16}\) the New York Times called "the devil incarnate" who had "betrayed every trust, forfeited his life, lost even honor..." \(^{17}\) and of whom the American ambassador to Turkey said "His nature had a remorselessness, a lack of pity, and a cold-blooded determination." \(^{18}\) One very plausible explanation for the two personalities of Enver may lie with the fact that though he became one of the most powerful and feared men in Turkey, he never quite knew how to utilize his personal appeal to turn himself into one of those leaders who inspire devotion and adulation from the people. He was said to have "those compelling qualities which defy definition but raise adherents," \(^{19}\) and during the first flush of excitement after the accession to the ultimatum that demanded the Sultan's abdication and the institution of the Constitution, he was the most popular hero of Turkey-young, handsome, brave and charming, with "personal magnetism" that seized the popular imagination.\(^{20}\) This was certainly the time to cement his relationship with the people, but instead of re-enforcing his current popularity Enver left Turkey. In 1909, Enver, now lieutenant-colonel, was sent to Berlin where, except for a brief return to be involved in putting down the "counter revolution," he remained as a Military Attaché,
What happened to Enver in Germany? He learned to speak a fluent if ungrammatical German, acquired a fondness for Prussian military mannerisms. He was fêted and petted by the Humann and Sarre families, and was the recipient of the friendship of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who saw his possibilities as a protegé who might some day be of use. Enver resigned his post in Berlin in the fall of 1911 and volunteered for action in the war in Libya. It is another illustration of the young officer's need for action and the chance to make the grand gesture, since this was not done compulsorily, but by his own choice. The route that he traveled to the Libyan front would tend to support the probability that need for drama was a large part of his motive.

At the time that Enver set out for Libya, Lord Kitchener, the British High Commissioner had forbidden any Turkish troops or officers to pass through Egypt. Enver disguised himself as an Arab wise man, and passed through the British lines in secret.

This is reminiscent of his disguising himself as a lemonade-seller to pass the word of the uprising to CUP members in Salonika at the outbreak of the revolution. Why Enver chose this way to journey to Libya he never said, but it was patently unnecessary; Mustafa Kemal and other officers managed to get to Tripoli without resorting to theatrical costume.
appears that the romantic element in Enver had decided his course of action: what more thrilling and dashing way to "arrive" at a military assignation than in disguise, having braved (albeit unnecessarily) the possibility of capture in Egypt by the British?

In Libya, Enver preached a Jihad (Holy war) against the infidel Italians, and with the backing of the religious organization of the Senussi Brotherhood, he was able to organize resistance to the Italian invasion. As commander of the Turkish forces in Libya, he acquitted himself honorably though not with any outstanding feat that would have earned him any large amount of public acclaim.

With the Turkish defeat by the Italians, and the loss of Libya as a result of the treaty of Ouchy (October 18, 1912), Enver returned to Turkey. He returned with the unshakeable belief that he had been divinely set apart to re-establish the glory of Turkey and make himself the great dictator. His idols were Bonaparte and Frederick the Great. "Napoleonlike," as his friends called him, said that he believed himself, like his heroes, to be a "man of destiny."
Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier. Seemingly satisfied to leave the
government in the hands of the new ministry that had been
formed within hours by his CUP cronies, Enver was soon marc-
hing at the head of a Turkish force on its way to liberate
Adrianople. (28) There was on hint that Enver would eventually
take over the position of Minister of War, or any other political
position. He was, at this time an upper eschelon member of the
CUP in good standing—the strong sword of the Young Turks,
the "hero of the revolution," who had no obvious political
ambitions.

As Chief of Staff of the left wing of the Turkish forces,
Enver was again in the position to make a dramatic gesture. On
July 15, 1913, after 26 unbroken hours in the saddle, Enver
took Adrianople (Edirne) and sent a message to the Sultan:
"I again lay the city of the holy tombs of your ancestors forever
before your feet." (29) This, like most of Enver's grandiose
gestures, fell just short of being impressive. Adrianople had been
taken almost without bloodshed, since the Bulgarians had aband-
oned the city before the arrival of the Turks.

After this triumph, Enver returned to Istanbul, and in the
ture tradition of the popular hero, married a princess. After
having spent some time in furtive peeping through lattice-work
and curtains at Enver as he rode by on his splendid white
horse, (30) Emine' Nadiye Sultan was given to Enver in marriage—
along with an Imperial allowance. (31) Although the story-book
career of Enver Pasha reached a point high enough to have satisfied almost any dreamer, this was not the top rung of the ladder for Damad (i.e., husband of princess) Enver Pasha. On January 4, 1914, Enver Pasha was appointed to the office of Minister of War, supreme military commander of Turkey.

II

Minister of War Enver Pasha

In his first few months in office, Enver seemed to be frenziedly purging the military of all of the aging generals of the Abdul Hamid era. In January of 1914, 1,100 officers were suddenly dismissed. His pre-German proclivities came to the fore, and he was now in a position to apply the principles of the German military system to the army of Turkey. One of the first steps in this direction had actually been set in motion before the ascent of Enver to the War Ministry. The Turkish government had already had a history of foreign military missions which had trained Turkish officers. The newest ones had been a German military mission under Field Marshall Liman von Sanders and a British naval mission under Admiral Limpus, both co-operating in re-organizing the Ottoman army and navy. According to Henry Morgenthau, who was the American ambassador to Turkey at that time, Liman von Sanders had a dual mission in Turkey—openly head of the German military mission...
and secretly, the Kaiser's "man" in Istanbul. As Morgenthau pointed out, this did not make for good relations between von Sanders and Ambassador Wangenheim, who, as chief German diplomat would supposedly be Wilhelm II's "man" in Turkey. Wangenheim did all that he could to undermine the influence of von Sanders, and was probably in good part responsible for the bad relationship between Enver Pacha and Liman von Sanders. Enver, who had an impulsive nature and was given to spur of moment dramatic stands was the psychological opposite of the rigid unbending Teutonic von Sanders.

Von Sanders and Enver steered a very uneven course together, with stormy letters and accusations flying between both men, as well as between each of them and Berlin. Von Sanders resigned (repeatedly) and Enver refused to accept the resignation. Von Sanders, as Chief of the German military staff, was grudgingly admitted to Ottoman Headquarters, but was ignored while there. Not only was he excluded from the making of Turkish military policy, but even his recommendations on general strategic issues were repeatedly ignored or rejected by Enver.  

World War I (1914-1918) broke out, triggered by the events at Sarajevo, and the European states; large and small, had aligned themselves on one side or another according to their loyalties. Von Sanders was greatly distressed by what he considered the Turkish procrastination in joining actively in the war.
For months after its outbreak, he had chafed at his inactivity in Turkey. He had been, to say the least, undiplomatic in his complaints and in his method of voicing them. Ambassador Wangenheim tried to have him recalled so that his "tactless" behavior would not interfere with policy that Germany was furthering with Turkey. Enver Pasha, as War minister, had too much power for Wangenheim to risk permitting von Sanders to alienate him. For this reason, Wangenheim tried to have von Sanders recalled and replaced by Field Marshall von der Goltz, whom Enver knew and admired. Instead of permitting von Sanders to return to Germany, Enver (according to Wangenheim's communique to Berlin on November 25, 1914) was thinking of placing von Sanders in command of the Ottoman Third Army, called the "Caucasus army."(36)

Von Sanders sent a protest to German Imperial Headquarters, to General Moritz von Lyncker, the chief of the Kaiser's Militärkabinett(37) explaining, among other things that the onset of winter would prohibit any large scale operations on the Transcaucasian front. He refused to accept command of the Third Army, and now insisted on remaining in Istanbul. Von Sanders' refusal to leave Istanbul provided Enver with a good excuse to take command of the Third Army himself, and to launch the first major Turkish offensive of the war.(38) Now that Turkey had entered into the war, (goading Turkish naval attacks in the Black Sea had driven Russia to declare war on the Ottomans on November 4, 1914. England and France followed suit the next day) von Sanders' refusal to go to the Transcaucasus put Enver Pasha into his favorite position gallantly leading his army into what he was certain would be victorious battle.
In December of 1914, Enver assumed command of the Caucasus army, which had a total strength of 90,000 men. He paid no attention to von Sanders, view that mid-winter was not the time to engage in operations against the Russians. Here, after too much time spent in bureaucratic drudgery, was action, Enver has been described as a "master of modern military tactics." (39) However, this, Enver's last personal battlefield command, was so poorly designed and planned, and had such tragic results (an estimated 80,000 casualties out of a 90,000 man force 40) that it is difficult to credit him with any talent as a strategist. There is no question of his personal courage and daring, but such qualities cannot be the only attributes of a good military leader. Enver left the remnants of his army, tragically decimated from the effects of facing the enemy, starvation, spotted fever, and freezing to death from camping in the snow without tents. He returned to Istanbul, leaving the command of what was left of the Caucasus army to Hafiz Hakki Pasha, who was considered his ambitious competitor. (41)

The fiasco on the Transcaucasian frontier appears to have been a turning-point in Enver's life. Gone was the charming officer, the modern knight-errant who was dashing, and beloved by his countrymen. In his place was the author of an incredible military disaster, wanton destroyer of 80,000 of his own men, who had to find an alternative to facing the fact of his personal responsibility for the failure. Enver dealt with the problem by
keeping it secret, by trying to erase it; it was forbidden to mention the fate of the Third army in Turkey—to do so was to be arrested and punished. (42)

It was, perhaps, not the loss of life or decimation of the army that was the shattering experience for Enver, but rather, the size and scale of public personal failure. Until this point, Enver had achieved the reputation of national hero who could do no wrong. Now, his shame was so enormous that he could not bear to admit that it existed. The other ruling members of the CUP went along with the suppression of the facts of the crying need to keep up the spirit and loyalty of a Turkey that had newly entered the war. January 3, 1915, and the destruction of the Ottoman Third Army, called the Caucasus army, seems to mark the end of demonstrably human rational behavior on the part of Enver Pasha.

1915 was the year of the Armenian massacres in Turkey, which were triggered by the deportation orders that the CUP government issued against the Armenian population. The deportations were categorized by Talaat Pasha, Minister of the Interior, as a military necessity to prevent possible Armenian cooperation with the Russians, and to avert the danger of revolt behind the Turkish lines. The deportation of the Armenians from Anatolia—ostensibly to Northern Syria or Iraq—was one of the most shocking occurrences of the war. No arrangements had been made for the enforced mass exodus of the civilian Anatolian Armenian population,
and as a result, men, women and children were compelled to march on foot without any provisions or water; while they were attacked, tortured and murdered—most of them never even reached the outskirts of their own villages. Unbelievable brutality was reported by foreign missionaries and doctors, as well as the few refugees who escaped.

The explanation that the murder and rapine was committed by Kurdish tribesmen is only partially true, since there is ample evidence that the Turkish citizenry as well as the army participated in the genocidal horror.

While there have been numerous charges and counter-charges in the matter, there is little doubt left that while the Germans did not order the brutal treatment of the Armenians, there was complicity in the actions of the Turks. Even though Trumpemer says that the Armenian persecution "was neither instigated nor welcomed by the German government" he at least has the grace to admit that they were "acutely embarrassed by it, but could not risk alienating the Turks by exerting any pressure to prevent it. (43) Ernest Jackh, on the other hand, presents the defense that, after all, this kind of thing does happen during war. (44) The most perceptive observation, though, comes from H. Charles Woods:

"Whilst the Armenian massacres of 1915 were conducted in a manner so different from..."
the system employed in former years, as to prove that they must have been actually encouraged by Germany, these massacres could not have been carried out but for the brutality of the Turkish leaders..." (45)

The attitude of Talaat Pasha toward the massacres is summed up in his statement to his friends, recorded by Ambassador Henry Morgenthau:

"I have accomplished more toward solving the Armenian problem in three months than Abdul Hamid accomplished in thirty years!" (46) Talaat seemed to be personally pleased at the idea of deportation and massacre as an answer to what he considered the Armenian "problem," but Enver was almost dispassionate in his attitude. He told Morgenthau: "We are completely justified in doing this, owing to the hostile attitude of the Armenians toward the Ottoman government." (47) While he did not go as far as Talaat, who suggested that Ambassador Morgenthau arrange to have the American life insurance companies make the Turkish government beneficiary of the dead Armenians since they had no heirs--- (48) Enver is said to be the only member of the Turkish cabinet that ordered the deportations in 1915 who "could not see anything wrong in them." (49) The Armenians, after all, were not Turks; there was, therefore, no reason to be concerned about them. What had happened to the young revolutionary hero Enver, who shouted the pan-Ottoman sentiment of
brotherhood to the people of Salonika that glorious day on the Hill of Liberty? He had been replaced with General Damad Enver Pasha, who was now only "Fully conscious of himself in his capacity of Turk." (50) The doctrine of pan-Ottomanism had been tossed aside to make way for the glory of being a Turk, just as the pre-Caucasus Enver had been tossed aside to make way for an Enver with a deeply wounded pride.

During that year of 1915, military events that transpired were conducive to confidence on the part of Turkey and her leaders. While the tragic affair of the Armenians "solved a problem" for the CUP, the successful defense of the Gallipoli peninsula and the Dardanelles, although it lasted ten months and the Turkish casualties amounted to over 200,000 men; (51) raised the spirit of the Turks, followed in 1916 by the successful campaign of Kut-al-Amara conducted by Enver's uncle Khalil Bey, it appeared as if the fortunes of the Turkish forces were on the up-swing. Again, though, we have irrational behavior on the part of Enver Pasha, perhaps indicative of his non-recognition of reality --a trait that precipitated the downward run of the war and ultimate defeat of the Turks.

Enver Pasha dissipated the Turkish resources in Mesopotamia by ordering the Persian expedition. He also assigned 100,000 men (five divisions and an infantry regiment re-formed from the best men available in the Turkish army) to Rumania,
Galicia and Thrace. This was considered a serious mistake by von Sanders; who felt that by this time it was "clear that Turkey was no longer able to protect her territories and frontiers", yet, there they were, three Turkish armies (53) assembled in Thrace where there was no enemy. The Hedjaz expedition, the advance against the Suez Canal, the collapse at Erzurum all are indications that Enver, who was in control of the disposition of the troops was no longer (if he was ever) capable of directing the course of a country at war. The disasters that fell clattering around the ears of a disintegrating country were directly due to the policy (or lack of policy) of its leaders, and, as Yale says, "The onus of blame rests most heavily on Minister of War Enver Pasha, who proved to be incompetent as a military commander and as chief administrator of the war effort." (54)

By 1917, in his review of the Turkish military position, von Sanders stated that although it is understood that one cannot invariably succeed in war, and even the best have reverses, "one should not sacrifice valuable troops when there is no hope of success, simply because one does not know whether to take offensive or to remain on the defensive." (55)

Throughout 1917—1918, the steady retreats of the Turks from Syria, Palestine, Iraq, the desertions of the troops (estimated at 300,000 by von Sanders—(56)—according to Yale, the number of Turkish deserters at least equaled the number of...
remaining troops) (87) disease, famine and the ensuing misery of the people made the position of Enver, as well as the rest of the visible C. U. P. leaders unenviably precarious. The Committee finally was forced to confess its failure, and on October 7, 1918 the C. U. P. cabinet resigned. Within two weeks the Committee of Union and Progress was completely dissolved. (58) On November 2, 1918, ex-Minister of War General Damad Enver Pasha fled from Turkey and made his way to Germany. He left behind him his wife, his three children, and a completely ruined Turkey. The country was a financial fiasco with a public debt of over 450 million Turkish pounds' four times that of 1913. It also had a casualty list of 1,400,000 with 890,000 sick or "disappeared" (total 2,290,000!). The population of Anatolia alone was reduced from 12,000,000 to 9,500,000. This was exclusive of the Armenian population, whose pre-war 1,845,000 had been reduced by 1,396,000. (69)

III

King Enver of Kurdistan (60)

Enver found that there was no place within reach of the Entente powers where he could be safe. He had been condemned to death in absentia in Turkey, and the Entente powers were demanding extradition of the Young Turk leaders. Enver lived semi-legally in Germany until April of 1919, when he acquired the use of an airplane (Trumpener suggests that it was with General von Seeckt's assistance (61)). He started out for Moscow, but mechanical trouble forced a landing in Lithuania.
The ex-minister of war, now known as plain "Mr. Altman" (63) sat in jail in Riga until friends in Berlin established his identity and secured his release. From there he returned to Berlin. A second attempt to reach Moscow was successful, and here one finds faint, if distorted traces of the old Enver. He proclaimed the Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (a Muslim 'International'), and with the backing of the Soviet government, he attended the Congress of the Peoples of the East, at Baku. He was the delegate of the Revolutionaries of Libya, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco, (There was also a Kemalist delegation from Turkey present!) (63)

Louise Bryant says that in Moscow Enver was a "social lion", but she hastens to explain that it was not because of his own efforts, but because of the circumstances, which were most dreary. (64) As charming as Enver was, his mind was more on political scheming than on social manoeuvres. As a guest of the Soviet government he was allotted quarters in a palace which was also used by other guests of the government. He met again with his uncle Khalil Bey, of Kut-al-Amara fame, and oddly enough for a man under sentence of death in Turkey, appeared socially with Ali Fuad Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador. (65) He spent his time manufacturing intrigues, writing letters to Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, trying to curry favor and gain a position in Kemal's government.

The paths of Mustafa Kemal and Enver Pasha had crossed several times. Both men were raised in Macedonia; both
were military academy products; both were active Young Turk conspirators—Mustafa Kemal was arrested as a revolutionary in 1905 on the very day he was commissioned.

Kemal resigned from the C. U. P. and founded his own parallel society, Vatan ('Fatherland'). Enver had a great deal of élan and personal charm which aided his career; Mustafa Kemal, however, although highly competent militarily, was abrupt and curt. As a colonel, Mustafa Kemal's bravery at the battle of Gallipoli in 1915 won him the title of Pasha, as well as the lifelong enmity of Enver.

Since Mustafa Kemal had resigned from the C. U. P. in 1909, he was in a position of total disassociation from the ruling clique at the time of their secret departure from the country after the admission of defeat inherent in the Mudros Armistice (October 30, 1918). At the time of that Armistice, Mustafa Kemal was the commanding general of the Syrian campaign—with a firm reputation as a successful commander, who disliked the Germans and their influence on the Ottoman Empire—a strong man who had energetically opposed Enver's disastrous military plans whenever possible, making no secret of his poor opinion of Minister of War Enver. The two men disliked each other intensely. They had quarreled during the early wars in Tripoli and the Balkans; when Enver was in power he strove to belittle Mustafa Kemal and remove him from public view by posting him to the Mesopotamian frontier; when Mustafa Kemal was in power he ignored the erstwhile Minister of War.
The question arises whether or not Enver actually thought that now, with the positions of the two men reversed, by his famous charm he could ingratiate himself into Kemal's plan for Turkey. They had parted ways long ago, and had been constant antagonists. During Enver's heyday he had delighted in humiliating Mustafa Kemal at every opportunity. He feared Kemal's strength and ambition, and had done all he could to destroy the career of the very man he now importuned for position. Did he really think that Kemal would trust him, or let him have anything to do with the new Turkey that he was building? It seems to be yet another instance of Enver's inability to see, let alone face reality, for surely no one who could remember clearly would expect that the past, like the fate of the Caucasus army, could be ingored. Perhaps, in his blindness Enver was not even aware of the act that while he was on the pinnacle of power, Mustafa Kemal was biding his time, waiting for his turn in the game of musical chairs. It must have been most galling to Enver Pasha to be the one who was "out".

It has been said of Enver that finally "he got bored, and started a war of his own", (66) Which may be close to the truth. Louis Fischer says that with Soviet support, he dreamed of re-establishing the kingdom of Tamerlane, "He saw himself the ruler of a realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan. Then, like Alexander..."
the Great, he would march through the Khyber Pass into India and strike a mortal blow at the British. He would be the Napoleon of Asia. " (67)"

When the Bolshevik government signed the Soviet-Anatolian treaty in 1921, all chance of gaining Soviet support for a triumphant re-entry into Turkey was finished. Enver made his way to Bokhara, where he put himself at the head of the Bokharan and Afghanistan insurgents, and proceeded to make war upon the Bolshevik government of Russia. Of his military tactics Fisher observes;

"His strategy almost invariably improved the position of the Red forces sent to destroy him." (68) In June of 1922, in the area near Derbent he attacked a Soviet division of eight thousand men who had artillery and trained cavalry. Enver's forces were estimated at three thousand men, and he suffered a resounding defeat. (69) It seems that Enver was making the same mistakes and using the same strategy that lost him Turkey.

The death of Enver is clouded with mystery. Most accounts say that he was killed in hand-to-hand combat in a mountain pass near the Afghan border, on August 4, 1922. The only body lying on the battlefield that was dressed in Western military uniform, i.e. boots, trousers and military jacket—all of the other bodies were dressed in long Bokharan robes and headdress
was identified as Enver Pasha. On his finger was a signet ring, and in his pocket were letters.\(^7\) Unmistakably Enver Pasha. Yet, Louise Bryant claimed that it was surely not so, that it was a "sham," since in a few days fighting in the area began again.\(^7\)

The New York Times announced the death of Enver Pasha in its edition of August 18, 1922. On the next day an article in the New York Times began "Enver Pasha has been killed again,"\(^7\) but on August 20, an item from Baku reported that Enver was still living, and had been seen by friends hundreds of miles from the spot where he was supposed to have died. It also says "Enver Pasha has been killed so regularly during the last few days that his friends consider the reports of his death unfounded."\(^8\)

This is followed as late as September 23 with "It is announced that Moscow has recognized the republic of Turkestan, comprising the former principalities of Jara and Khiva, with Enver Pasha as President. The latter is trying to extend his sway over all of Turkestan."\(^9\) After this, no more was heard of Enver Pasha. He passed from the scene in true story-book manner—perhaps fighting like a knight in combat, perhaps ruling over his "Kingdom." Most probably he did die that day in August, and quite likely it is Enver Pasha who lies in
that unmarked grave in a spot that is not known, in an unidentified mountain pass in southern Russia.

Coda

Henry Morgenthau says that when he met Lord Kitchener, he (Kitchener) was particularly anxious to know about Enver. "He was surprised that a man like Enver, who had never won a battle, and was only a revolutionary, and not a soldier, should be raised from the rank of Major to be Minister of War." (75)

Perhaps Kitchener’s statement—"only a revolutionary"—is the key to the character of Enver. Several times in his career Enver Pasha had been in a position to be what is known as a "charismatic leader" and every time he fell just short. He had most of the qualifications—courage, daring, and a sense of drama. He was dapper and handsome; and he knew how to wear his uniform—a son whom a Turkish mother would idolize. (76) All of his contemporaries agree that he was personally austere; (77) that he had a boundless ambition, was inordinately vain, haughty and reckless; however, all, friends and enemies alike, admit that "to do him justice, (he was) energetic, enterprising, fearless and determined." (78) Why then, with all of the given opportunities, did Enver fail to achieve the position of a true leader?

Probably the most important reason was that Enver Pasha was simply out of his depth. He was literally not capable of
becoming anything more than a temporary hero, made, as much by the moment as by any personal action. He arrived on the scene perhaps in a period of limbo, just as the Ottoman Empire was dying and just before the time when conditions were conducive to the birth of a modern Turkey. It is, perhaps, fortuitous that his rise was in this period—for had he been in power when Turkey was trying to bring order out of chaos in the postwar period, it is probable that the country would never have survived his vain posturings and his colossal ineptitude. He never had an adequate knowledge of world or international politics—even his pro-German sentiments were occasioned by his admiration for the German military external trappings and by response to the personal flattery offered him during his stay in Germany.

René Pinon’s opinion is that the fault lay with Enver’s being “at bottom without wide views... and (in) offering as a substitute for genius a limitless ambition and vanity.” (79) This is valid as far as it goes, but the underlying reason for the incredible miscreancy of Enver’s career was simply that he was a mediocre, short-sighted, mentally small man who wanted to be a leader, a famous figure like Napoleon, or Frederick the Great, or Alexander. Ironically, the era of Enver was probably a necessary precursor to Mustafa Kemal’s rise to power. It is quite possible that such a grossly inferior leader as Enver prepared the way for the stronger man’s bold and ruthless reorganization of Turkey.
NOTES

(1) Kurt Okay, Enver Pascha der grosse Freund Deutschlands (Berlin, 1935), The author’s true name has not been disclosed.


(3) Rustow, "Enver Pasha", p. 698.


(9) Rustow, "Enver Pasha", p. 698.


(12) Louise Bryant, Mirrors of Moscow, (New York, 1923) p. 155. Enver was referring to the attempts by the American ambassador to either halt the deportation of the Armenians, and the ensuing massacres, or at least to permit foreign aid to the distressed Armenians.

(13) Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, p. 364.


(18) Morgenthau; Morgenthau's Story, p. 31.
(20) Ibid. ....
(22) Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1014—1918. (Princeton, 1968) p. 18.
(25) Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, p. 31.
(26) Ibid.; p. 32.
(27) Granville Fortescue, Russia, the Balkans and the Dardanelles (London, n. d.) p. 207.
(31) Morgenthau; Morgenthau's Story, p. 115.
(34) Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story; p. 43.
(35) Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, p. 72.
(36) Ibid., p. 75.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, p. 75.
(41) Von Sanders, Five Years, p. 40.
(42) Ibid, See also Yale, Near East, p. 219.
(43) Trumpener; Germany and the Ottoman Empire, p. 205.
(44) Jackh, Rising Crescent, p. 42-44.
(46) Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, p 342.
(47) Ibid., p. 352.
(48) Ibid., p. 339.
(51) Yale, op. cit. p. 225.
(52) von Sanders; op. cit. p. 121.
(53) Howard M. Sachar The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914 — 1924 (New York, 1969) p. 35.
(54) Yale, op. cit. p. 232.
(55) von Sanders, op. cit. p. 190.
(56) Ibid. p. 191.
(57) Yale op. cit. p. 241.
(58) Sachar op. cit. p. 547.
(59) Sachar, op. cit. p. 106.
(60) New York Times, Dec 14; 1919, "Crown Enver Pasha King of Kurdistan".
(61) Trumpener, op. cit. p. 362.
(62) Bryant op. cit p 187.
(63) Rustow; op. cit. p. 700.
(64) Bryant, op. cit. p. 150.
(65) Ibid, p. 151.
(66) Bryant, op. cit. p. 159.
(67) Fischer, op. cit. p. 235.
(68) Fischer, op. cit. p. 238.
(69) Ibid.
(70) Ibid, p. 239; Bryant op. cit. p. 161.
(71) Bryant, op. cit. p. 162.
(73) « Enver Pasha » New York Times, 20 August; 1922; p. 10.
(77) Bryant, Moscow Mirror, p. 154.
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